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1Social Movements and the Ethics of Knowledge Production
Introduction
In this chapter, I will argue that the study of social movements within the academy retains
an implicit positivism that is underpinned by the idea that we live in a ‘social movement
society’ (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). This idea is very appealing, suggesting as it does, that
advanced industrial democracies have institutionalised social movement forms of
representing claims to such an extent, that they have become a conventional part of the
accepted mechanisms for democratic participation. However, the legacy of this normative
framework is that movements are largely perceived as objects of knowledge for
academics, rather than as knowledge-producers in their own right. So whilst the
knowledge they formulate about their areas of concern is evidently interesting for policy
makers, their ontological or epistemological frameworks are less so because they are
already assimilated within the normative ontology of liberal democracy.
I will argue that this epistemological prioritization of academic knowledge production
about movements continues, despite the turn towards a phenomenological epistemology
by theorists of social movements, who recognise movements as knowledge producing
subjects with whom the academy might engage in processes of co-production (Melucci,
1989, 1996b, Santos, 2003, Escobar, 2008). This is ethically problematic, not least
because social movements are liable to be reduced to commodifiable objects of
2knowledge to enhance either an academic’s career or reputation and/or their university’s
competitive standing (Federici, 2009).
Instead, I will argue that social activism produces critical subjectivities whose contextual
and situated knowledge is both independent of the academy and valuable in its own right
(Conway, 2004, Casas-Cortés, Osterweil & Powell, 2008, Cox and Fominaya, 2009).
This requires those of us situated in the academy to examine the ontological and
epistemological basis from which we engage with social movements and the
methodological commitments such an approach might oblige. Such an approach can be
suggestive of an ethics of engagement that emphasises relationality, reciprocity, and an
openness to causal mechanisms of ‘becoming’ that are outside liberal democratic
strictures.
Consequently, the first half of this article seeks to situate the work of the influential social
movement theorist Alberto Melucci (1996) within a realist ontological tradition (Giddens,
1984, Bhaskar, 1989) that can help us to understand the knowledge-practices of social
movements. It then moves on to consider a methodological approach to research that is
sensitive to the differing knowledge-practices of academics, activists, activist-academics
and activist researchers and concludes by offering some examples of the methodological
innovations such an account might require to be ethically consistent, drawing upon
anthropological and feminist critiques of classical ethnography.
3This article also contends that the ontological and epistemological frameworks articulated
and practiced by some contemporary social movements offer sophisticated examples of
how to think about the production of knowledge and its relationship to practice, and
highlights instances of these within the contemporary movement milieu.  To begin with
though, it is perhaps worth reminding ourselves why the knowledge-practices of social
movements are crucial to our understanding of new ways of being and acting together,
that might address the failure of the ‘business as usual’ of the neoliberal model (Mattick,
2011, Harvey, 2010).
The contemporary context and a politics of possibilities1
At the end of the first decade of the 21st Century we are faced by a number of interrelated
and dynamically connected complex crises, all of which involve potentially dramatic
tipping points that will impact upon human/ecological systems. These range from
irreversible climate change, peak oil and crises of food and fuel production to market
crashes and financial contagion.
Civil society and social movements are frequently at the forefront of knowledge
generation about potential crises in human/ecological systems and can be conceived as
critical sensors of systems moving from the edge of chaos towards more profound
societal and environmental change (Johnson, 2002). In some instances, social movements
are also capable of acting as facilitators of feedback systems that can avert or promote
                                                 
1 This is a term kindly suggested to me by Kevin Gillan.
4these processes through their generation of different lifestyles, resistance or adaptation
strategies, and alternative social and economic policies (Urry, 2003, Chesters & Welsh,
2006). Despite this, formal political systems are frequently slow to respond to the
production of new knowledge by social movements and the relationship between
movements and political elites is often antagonistic due to the inherent difficulty of
accommodating social movement activism within representative democracies, without
the loss of institutional political capital.
Therefore the motivation behind this paper is the observation that if we are going to
respond in a just and sustainable way to the challenges of the complex and converging
crises outlined above, we need to move beyond an analysis of movements that sees them
solely as producers of knowledge about those things they campaign for, or against.
Instead, we must recognize their capacity to develop alternative political imaginaries – a
politics of possibilities - and theories of knowledge about how to actualize these
imagined possibilities.
This will require a deepening in our understanding of how social movements can be
recognised as mobilising knowledge and resources with the aim of generating tipping
points in political values, actions and behaviours and helping us avert, or adapt to,
potentially dramatic tipping points in human/ecological systems. In order to begin this
process, I would argue we need to refine our understanding of how we undertake social
movement research and to question the meaning of social movements for the academy.
5Ethically informed and participatory approaches to researching with marginalized or
oppressed communities are familiar from participatory action research (PAR) (Friere,
1982, Chambers, 1983), which explicitly incorporates an ethic of inclusion and ‘care’
(Gilligan, 1982) and also from within critical approaches to qualitative inquiry (Denzin,
Lincoln, Tuhiwai Smith, 2008). I will argue that a further ethical consideration here is to
conduct research that is consistent with the idea, voiced by social movements themselves
(Collectivo Stuaciones, 2005, Shukaitis & Graeber 2007) and key movement theorists
(Melucci, 1989, 1996b), that social movements are spaces of knowledge production about
the limits and possibilities of agency and structure within a given society. I will further
argue that Melucci’s (1989, 1996b) ontology of movements is in keeping with a realist
and materialist orientation in social science and that this provides the most appropriate
conceptual framework for engaging with the social and political ontologies and
epistemologies produced by social movements.
Engaging with movements: ontology first?
Social movement activism is normally premised on a critique of the status quo and an
analysis of possibilities for change (Gillan, 2008). It requires the communication of both
critiques and alternatives and an appeal to what is presumed to be the shared morality of
wider publics, for whom the alternatives asserted might be regarded as superior on
grounds of equality, justice or sustainability. In this sense movements operationalise the
idea of the ontological as a realm of possibility – a strategy illustrated by the slogan
‘Another World is Possible’ (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003), which subsequently became
pluralized to ‘Other Worlds Are Possible’. Ontology comes first, the assertion of a
6political imaginary that is recursively developed epistemologically through experiences
of experimentation with counter-normative forms of expression, relationship or lifestyle.
Consequently, the knowledge-practices of movements frequently result from embodied
and affective experiences that are outside of the analytical standpoint of the academic,
whose methodology is reliant upon the presumed reliability of simple representative
forms - interviews and other texts that ‘retain an implicit ontology of the “empirical
world”’ (Outhwaite, 1987:32). From the perspective of critical realists this is an
‘epistemic fallacy’ (Collier, 1994:137) which has misled positivists, empiricists and
‘rationalists’ since Descartes (Collier, 1994:137, Outhwaite, 1987:36-37).   It is this
critique and its relationship to social movement studies, methodology and ethics that we
can now begin to explore.
What are we seeking knowledge of?
In order to know, we must first have something to know about, and we must distinguish
what properties this ‘something’ has in order to ascertain whether it is a possible source
of knowledge for us (Bhaskar, 1989:13). For social scientists, the sources of possible
knowledge are people and societies, and as Collier (1994) observes we are therefore
obliged to offer some model of what people and societies are or might become.  This, of
course, is also a foundational question for social movements concerned with radical
social change. Meaning that if social scientists are to act ethically towards social
movements and to treat them as knowledge-producers, social scientists are required to
take account of the ontological frameworks movements advance – the political
7imaginaries and alternative accounts of what might be possible within a given society.
In order to attempt this, this article will show how methodological guidelines for
engaging in the co-production of knowledge with social movement actors can be elicited
from within ‘classical’ attempts at articulating complex ontologies. After consideration of
these perspectives I will then turn to the social movement theorist who is perhaps most
sensitive to these issues - Alberto Melucci (1989, 1996a, 1996b), and describe his journey
from ontology to methodology in his analysis of collective action, replete with critical
reflection on the effectiveness or indeed the desirability of such a journey. Furthermore I
will argue that a ‘realist’ ontology is ethical because it provides for claims to knowledge
‘by’ social movements that have urgent social and political implications, rather than
knowledge ‘about’ social movements which treats their own concerns as secondary or
relative to their own specific ontology/cosmology.
I begin this task by confronting the dualistic heritage of ‘sociological modernism’
(Stones, 1996:1), the somewhat artificial division between structure and agency, which
continues to problematise our understanding of what we can know. Possibly the most
well known attempt to resolve this dichotomy is Giddens’ (1984) ‘Structuration Theory’
and I will try and show how consideration of such frameworks might lead us deeper in to
consideration of an informed and ethically consistent research methodology.
Giddens’ conception of society is ‘relational’; that is, we are defined in a given context
by our relation, one to another. My subjectivity is constituted as a product of a complex
8set of relations situated within a web of other relations and material contexts. Subjectivity
is continuously (re)constructed and therefore continuously (re)constructs; self and society
are therefore two sides of the same coin. Society is, and can only ever be, people and the
material results of their actions (Collier, 1994:139). However, this does not imply some
reductionist or individualist conception of society; rather it demonstrates the complexity
of a society, where who we are becomes a matter of who is asking the question because
of the multiple networks of relationships in which we are embedded (Melucci, 1996a:50).
Although Giddens’ articulation of a rich, diverse, and flexible ontology is premised on a
relational understanding of how society and the self are formulated, and this accords with
other advanced ontologies such as those of the critical realist Roy Bhaskar (1989), it also
suggests epistemological and methodological questions which ultimately neither Giddens
(1994) nor Bhaskar (1989) resolve.
Giddens’ own foray into methodology alights upon a reflexive and hermeneutically
informed ethnographic research as consistent with his ontology. However, his apparent
unwillingness to develop or advocate a methodology incorporating these musings has
been interpreted by Stones (1996:88) as a reluctance to engage with a view of
epistemology and methodology ‘taken from the past’, where ‘methodological rules were
mean spirited and narrow, desiring to squash all the variety of the world into the same
small bottle’. Although Giddens demonstrably privileges a methodology that seeks to
represent social phenomena in all their ontological richness, the ontologically sensitised
researcher, seeking guidance on co-producing knowledge, is left wondering how s/he
9might argue that what they are engaged in is in some way different from the approach of
those who do not privilege ontology before epistemology.
In seeking to avoid a prescriptive approach to methodology, thereby avoiding the critique
levelled at logical positivists, Giddens is susceptible to the criticism that he has not
moved beyond an ‘anything goes’ approach (Feyerabend, 1993) and is therefore
complicit in what Stones (1996:20) calls ‘defeatist postmodernism’.
Therefore, when we examine a classic account of social research, such as  Giddens’
(1984), we find that although it is ontologically bold, it remains methodologically
cautious, as Giddens chooses to avoid spelling out what he infers would be an
unnecessary and prescriptive set of methodological guidelines. Rather, one is left with the
feeling that Giddens’ structuration theory might act as the conscience of the researcher.
Whilst persuasive, his ontology appears ‘arrived at’, rather than ‘worked out’, or as
Stones (1996:32) describes it ‘(a) common-sensical method of constructing an ontology
on the basis of selective critique’. Consequently, it is worth looking at a further ‘realist’
approach to the same problem.
Bhaskar and Critical Realism
One of the most influential attempts to elucidate a complex and sophisticated ontology,
and that from which the term ‘critical realism’ is derived, is Roy Bhaskar’s (1979) work.
Bhaskar’s (1979, 1986, 1989) realist ontology is premised on a response to the Kantian
question - how is science possible? Or, as Collier reframed it - how are experiments
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possible? (1994:31) Outhwaite summarised the Bhaskarian reply as follows:
‘.. for science to be possible or intelligible, the world must be made up of
real things and structures’(Outhwaite, 1987:31).
Bhaskar argues that the conjunctions observed in a laboratory, which occur because of
careful manipulation by scientists, do so due to the intrinsic properties of the objects
involved. Consequently, we must presume the continued existence of such properties
outside the laboratory, whether or not they are ever demonstrated. The ‘open systems’ of
the social and natural world are what Bhaskar is concerned with, and he has sought to
illuminate the complexity and contingency of simple acts in order to demonstrate the
empiricist fallacy of presuming that regular conjunctions are the result of simple causal
chains. This led Bhaskar to develop his model of the ‘stratification of reality’, which as
Stones observes, has a ‘three-fold ontological distinction’ (1996:29).
The distinction is between:
(1) The real mechanism - an object’s inherent powers;
(2) the actual event - the dormancy or actualisation of those powers; and
(3) the empirical event - that aspect of the event which is observed.
The ontological implications of this ‘stratification of reality’ undermine theories that
place a different, normally inferior ontological status on causal mechanisms. Whilst
mechanisms are not experienced and do not occur as events, they are nonetheless the
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basis of the causal criteria we routinely apply to reality, as Collier notes:
‘within the level of the Actual we are employing causal criteria all the
time, and would never get out of the Empirical if we did not: when we
find the garden muddy in the morning, we assume a real rainstorm,
though we slept through it; a murder victim implies a murderer, even
though one might never be identified’ (1994:44).
Less sophisticated ontologies ignore causal mechanisms, preferring only those things that
are a possible object of experience, thus drastically flattening out what might be ‘known’.
To summarise then, the domain of the real (that which is inclusive of the multiplicity of
hidden causal mechanisms) is greater than or equal to the domain of the actual (what
occurs), which in turn is greater than or equal to the domain of the empirical (that which
can be observed) (Collier, 1994:45). In open systems there occur a multitude of events
that are jointly co-produced by a multiplicity of mechanisms, so that whilst it is possible
to arrive at partial closure in the natural sciences, thereby demonstrably exhibiting a
causal mechanism, this is not the case in the social sciences. Theoretically, however,
because of the ‘stratification of reality’ and the existence of causal mechanisms, events in
principle are explicable. Stones has taken this principle as a methodological benchmark,
which, whilst evidently unachievable, serves ‘as a point of reference by which we can
judge how far our accounts fall short of the rich reality of events’ (1996:7).
Methodologically, then, this principle obliges:
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‘…the answering of a research question with utterly exhaustive detail;
absolutely everything relevant to a question in terms of, for example,
hermeneutics and contiguity or power or material resources, must be
included in order for an account to be exhaustive and closed to any further
extension.’ (1996:7).
Although utopian, this ideal allows us to ponder the implications of a critical realist
ontology for the research process of engaging with social movements.
However, like Giddens, Bhaskar refrains from discussion of research techniques that
would concur with his ontology, leaving us to look to elsewhere for methodological
guidelines for engagement in the co-production of knowledge with social movement
actors. Here I turn to the study of collective action as outlined by Alberto Melucci (1989,
1996a, 1996b), which I would argue is consistent with the disposition towards ontology,
epistemology and methodology outlined above.
Melucci: reconstructing the complexity of collective action
Alberto Melucci first introduced the term ‘new social movements’ into sociological
literature in 1977 (later to be translated into English: Melucci, 1980, 1981). It is a term
which, although problematic (Melucci, 1995:107-119), has come to be enormously
influential in research on collective action, thereby establishing Melucci as a prominent
figure in the sociology of social movements, a theorist whose work:
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‘…recast existing theoretical approaches under a new focus and thus has
raised innovative concepts and frameworks to explain contemporary
social movements’ (Bartholomew and Mayer, 1992:141).
There are a number of reasons for situating Melucci’s work within the debate about the
epistemological and methodological consequences of an ontology drawn from
structuration theory and critical realism. The rapid growth in collective action around
issues of race, gender, disability, age, peace and the environment led Melucci to a
rejection of inherited analytical frameworks. Social movements became indicative of
what Melucci termed ‘frontier land’ (1992), the open space which reveals the
contingency of any existing order. This is the marginal space, the space revealed by
analysis of structure and agency, and is therefore uniquely implicated in both Giddens’
(1984) discussion of structuration theory and Bhaskar’s (1989) critical realism. As
Melucci observed:
‘this field of sociological research is like a gymnasium for students who
wish to take on the challenge of investigating the relationship between
social systems and actors’ (1992:239).
Melucci (1988) begins his critique of existing analytical frameworks by criticising their
limited ontology. Traditional structural-functionalist perspectives (Smelser, 1962), he
argues, represented collective action as a response to a perceived disorder. Alternatively,
Marxists were apt to conceive collective action as an expression of the objective
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conditions arising from a capitalist mode of production, which also lent meaning to the
action. Melucci (1988:335), however, rejects both perspectives as suffering from the
same ‘epistemological misunderstanding’. Their error, he argues, is the treatment of a
collective phenomenon as a ‘unitary empirical datum’ (1988: 330 original emphasis):
‘The occurrence of certain concomitant individual behaviours forms a
unitary gestalt that is transferred from the phenomenological to the
conceptual level and acquires ontological consistency: The collective
reality exists as a thing’ (1988:330).
The two ‘traditional’ models, therefore, have a series of ontological building blocks from
which to theorise. The causal factors - motivations, anxieties, debate, communication,
discussion and negotiation - which are central to the maintenance of any collective
identity, and more particularly any collective action, are already lost. The ontologies of
the Marxist and the functionalist are drastically flattened, as Bartholomew and Meyer
(1992:142) point out when citing Melucci (1989): ‘The result is a view of social
movements marching through history “towards a destiny of liberation, or as crowds in the
grip of suggestion”’. This criticism of the flattening of ontology to the empirical through
a teleological perspective, or what Melucci referred to as the ‘myopia of the visible’
(1988:337) is of course reminiscent of the critique Bhaskar (1979, 1989) mounted against
positivism; such a flattened ontology is unable to elucidate causal factors in any other
than the most reductionist terms.
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Melucci also suggests that the significance of the term ‘new social movement’ has
become its contribution to the same reductionist conceptions of collective action. The
argument as to whether something is ‘new’ or not is of course a relative one that Melucci
originally deployed to demonstrate the weakness of the existing theoretical standpoints.
Defender and protagonist alike make the same epistemological error when referring to the
‘new social movements’ in debates as to whether or not they are new. Invariably, the
debate is grounded in an understanding of a movement as a unified empirical object and
thus:
‘they fail to recognize that collective action always consists of various
components (analytical levels, types of relationship, orientations and
meanings)’ (Melucci, 1995:110).
Melucci’s emphasis upon causal mechanisms, interaction of praxis and structure, and the
continuing construction and reconstruction of a movement, whose contingency is framed
by such processes, accords with the ontological perspectives of both Giddens and
Bhaskar. In the following extract, which bears citing at length, Melucci indicates with
precision the epistemological implications of an ontology which sits easily with both
Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory and Bhaskar’s (1989) critical realism:
‘Collective action should thus be considered as the result of purposes,
resources and limits: as a purposive orientation constructed by means of
social relationships within a system of opportunities and constraints. It
therefore cannot be viewed as the simple effect of structural preconditions
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or the expression of values and beliefs. Individuals acting together
construct their action by means of organized investments: that is, they
define in cognitive, affective and relational terms the field of possibilities
and limits which they perceive, while at the same time activating their
relationships so as to give sense to their being together and the goals that
they pursue’ (Melucci, 1995:111).
Melucci acknowledges the explicit relation between his ontology and that articulated by
Giddens, citing Giddens (1984) as a necessary brake upon a radical constructivism which
it is impossible to sustain when one recognises that: ‘Action is an interactive, constructive
process within a field of possibilities and limitations recognised by actors’ (1992:254).
Given the ontological parallels between Melucci and what has been characterised here as
a realist ontology, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that the epistemological consequences
of Melucci’s ontology lead to his advocating a methodological framework which he
believes is consistent with his philosophical insight:
‘It is not only necessary to develop new techniques, but also to make ever
more explicit, as part of the research process itself, the social relations and
options which are the basis for the practices adopted and that make it
possible’ (1992: 256).
This journey from ontology through epistemology to methodology accords with that
advocated by Stones (1996:19), whose emphasis upon the ‘social agent’s frames of
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meaning’ and the context-dependency of those meanings parallels Melucci’s (1992a:256)
‘situational epistemology’, both emphasise the importance of mediations, and both seek
to uncover the mechanisms by which social phenomena are produced. In this sense it is
clear that Melucci adheres to Stones’ concept of a ‘sophisticated realism’ - ‘whose
acknowledgement of a rich and complex ontology is accompanied and matched by the
adoption of a finely grained set of reflexive guidelines’ (Stones, 1996:232). This leads us
to consideration of how this is enacted and where we might look for evidence of this in
practice. It might also be unsurprising that such examples often occur outside the
academy.
The practice of knowledge production.
‘What we must recognize is that actors themselves can make sense out of
what they are doing, autonomously of any evangelical or manipulative
interventions of the researcher. And in the disenchanted world of
consummate systemic processes where epistemological privileges have
been divested together with everything hereditary and natural, all meaning
is judged not by the correctness of its content but by the processes of its
creation.’ (Melucci, 1996b: 389).
This article argues that one of the central ethical issues in researching social movements
is a failure to make explicit the ontological and epistemological premises that underpin
social movement research. This I suggest can lead to positions where movements are
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overly determined as ‘unitary empirical datum’ (Melucci, 1996:330) or alternatively they
are interpreted largely within their own frames of reference and without challenge,
whereas attempts at co-production require more substantial discussion on the foundations
of knowledge claims, which inevitably requires reflection on the ontologies and
epistemologies of all parties. Put simply, the contention of the paper is that the social and
political ontologies and epistemological practices of contemporary social movements
should be taken seriously if one is to act ethically in relation to these movements.
Social movements have long been bearers of knowledge about forms of oppression and
injustice, expressing political claims, identifying social and economic grievances and
bringing new or neglected issues to public prominence. They have been in the forefront
of debates about how social divisions including gender, race, sexuality, age and religion,
structure society and reproduce power structures including prevailing norms and values,
as well as debates about the possibilities of agency in social change processes. They have
also been prominent in highlighting the social and environmental implications of the
application of new sciences and technologies from manufacturing processes to nuclear
fission (http://www.clamshell-tvs.org/), genetically modified organisms
(http://www.saynotogmos.org/) to cloning and nanotechnology
(http://www.daa.org.uk/index.php?page=left-bioethics). Social movements produce
knowledge that is often challenging to those in power or which might be difficult for a
society to confront – levels of sexual abuse, the treatment of the mentally ill
(http://madpride.org.uk/index.php), the stigmatisation of those with HIV/AIDs etc.
However, rarely are social movements explicitly recognised as producers of knowledge,
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despite their influence in shaping various academic disciplines including womens’
studies, peace studies, adult and popular education, black and post-colonial studies, queer
studies etc. These disciplines have been richly innovative in both their approaches to, and
work with movements, and yet for the most part social movements are still considered as
objects of knowledge for researchers and academics, rather than as knowledge producers
in their own right.
This began to change during the final decades of the 20th and the first decade of the 21st
Century, during a wave of social movement mobilisation focussed on resistance to the
globalisation of neo-liberal capitalism and the promotion of ‘social justice’ (Notes from
Nowhere, 2003). It can be argued that these movements were prescient in identifying
issues that would subsequently move to the centre of mainstream political debate and
were amongst the first to offer a cogent critique of the inequity and structural limitations
of the global financial system that had been emerging from the late 1980s (Danaher and
Burbach, 2000, Houtart & Polet, 2001). It has also been argued that the reflexive
practices of social movement activism during this period, from the Zapatista inspired
encuentros (Holloway & Pelaez, 1998) to the dialogical and deliberative spaces of the
World Social Forum (Sen, Anand, Escobar & Waterman 2004), represented a qualitative
shift in the methodology of global social movements. This is important because meaning
making and knowledge production subsequently became key activities of these
movements (Cox and Fominaya, 2009).
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This wave of mobilisation produced a generation of academic-activists and activist-
researchers who have sought to challenge the epistemological premises of orthodox
social movement studies. Including theoretically and methodologically operationalising
long established critiques of positivist and Cartesian epistemologies, by blurring the
boundaries between the subject and object of knowledge and pursuing practices of co-
producing knowledge with, rather than on movements (Conway, 2004, Casas-Cortés,
Osterweil & Powell, 2008, Cox and Fominaya, 2009). This milieu has produced some
fascinating work on the specificities of local and indigenous knowledges and their
implications for understanding the ‘global’ (Escobar, 1998, 2009), as well as a variety of
attempts to develop ‘knowledge-practices’ (Casas-Cortés, Osterweil & Powell, 2008) that
bridge academic and movement domains (Notes from Nowhere, 2003, Sen, Anand,
Escobar & Waterman 2004, Collectivo Situaciones, 2005, Graeber & Shukaitis, 2007,
Turbulence Collective, 2010).
The compound term ‘knowledge-practice’ has much in common with the older but
closely allied concept of cognitive-practice (Eyerman and Jamison, 1991) and it reflects
theorisations of social movements as knowledge producers, rather than merely as objects
of knowledge for social movement scholars. The use of the compound term ‘knowledge-
practice’ (Casas-Cortés, Osterweil & Powell, 2008) is also used to indicate where
activism is understood as productive of critical subjectivities whose situated and
contextual knowledge is prioritised in its own right. The danger being here, of course, is
that this simply becomes a ‘relativist’ or ‘anything goes’ approach, where valorizing the
contextual undermines any claims to the wider value or application of the knowledge
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being produced.
So what methodological insights are to be derived from the complex and ‘realist’
ontology outlined above and how might these reflect the many situated ‘truths’
discovered by social movement experimentation with new forms of social and political
life. Qualitative engagement through participatory methodologies ranging from
participatory action research (Frier, 1982, Chambers, 1983) to visual and cartographic
methodologies (Counter Cartographies Collective: http://www.countercartographies.org/)
to autoethnography  (Reed-Danahay, 1997, Ellis, 2008) and autoethnographic activism
(BRE, 2007) offer insights in to a practice of co-production that are sensitive to a situated
epistemology. Consequently I continue to argue that developing this bricolage of
approaches is akin to ‘…an ethical attempt to humanize activist and academic practice –
to consider human bodies, desires, endurance, affects, quirks – to create an new activist
and intellectual ethic’. One that is ‘based on the idea that self-making and ethics are at the
core of any effective and radical political project.’ (Osterweil and Chesters, 2007: 254).
However, such methods are often described as invoking a set of ‘dangers’ prescribed by
the academy because they constitute a tendency towards ‘surrender’ or ‘becoming’
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:115). So, whilst mainstream ethnography warns of the
need to critically evaluate the role of the researcher towards the researched, and assert the
need to suspend judgement upon the supposed reality of appearances, there remains a
firmly held belief in the need to maintain a critical distance between researcher and
researched (Evans, 1992:200-01).  This also involves establishing clear boundaries as to
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what constitutes the research context, which Hammersley and Atkinson (1995:112) assert
requires the ethnographer to be ‘intellectually poised between familiarity and strangeness;
and, in overt participant observation, socially he or she will usually be poised between
stranger and friend’. This leads them to suggest that ethnographers ‘must strenuously
avoid “feeling at home”’ (1995:115) and that the researcher must remain a ‘marginal
native’ (1995:112 citing Freilich, 1970).
However, these arguments appear deeply problematic in the light of the work of those
concerning themselves with the practice of co-producing knowledge with social
movements (Conway, 2004, Casas-Cortés, Osterweil & Powell, 2008, Cox and
Fominaya, 2009). They also contrast with the potential of a critically reflexive and
emancipatory research practice, such as that identified in feminist epistemologies
(Harding, 1987, Lather, 1991, Stanley & Wise, 1993, Gibson-Graham, 2006), as well as
those identified by anthropologists (Cohen, 1992, Escobar, 1995).
Melucci (1996b:393-397) has also been critical of the implicit assumptions of such an
approach, which often remain unchallenged:
‘Acknowledging both in ourselves as scientists and in the collective actors
the limited rationality which characterizes social action, researchers can
no longer apply the criteria of truth or morality defended a priori, outside
of the relationship. Researchers must also participate in the uncertainty,
testing the limits of their instruments and of their ethical values.’
(1996b:395)
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For Lather, it is acknowledgement of this uncertainty that characterises emancipatory
feminist research practice: 'courage to think and act within an uncertain framework
emerges as the hallmark of liberatory praxis in a time marked by the dissolution of
authoritative foundations of knowledge' (1991:13).
A process of ethical research, then, considered from these perspectives, is an unfolding of
obligations and limitations developing from the relational dimension of the interaction.
This requires one’s own position of power, security or vulnerability to be open to analysis
and contest. The academy has no a priori reason or justification for making demands
upon those it seeks knowledge of; indeed, if we are serious about countenancing an
ethical research practice it is necessary to situate that practice within an explicit
description of how the research is sustained and from where our sources our support are
drawn.
There is often an implicit expectation amongst social activists that academics researching
with social movements will intervene to offer resources and/or expertise during
encounters with the state or the corporate sector and this is sometimes romantically
presented by academics as risk-taking behaviour. However, such narratives do a
disservice to the relational obligations of reciprocity derived from activist support for
research processes, by providing access to information and resources that they have no
prior obligation to give. Consequently, although engagement within supportive actions
are associated in the academic literature with the risk of compromising the ‘goal of
producing knowledge’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:286), they are instead,
invaluable articulations of the ethic of co-production, which recognizes the
epistemological complexity of respecting movement ontologies. Hammersley and
Atkinson’s definition of ethnography would therefore appear at odds with the methods
one might derive from a Meluccian approach to the study of movements:
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‘There must always remain some part held back, some social and
intellectual distance. For it is in the space created by this distance that the
analytical work gets done’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995:115).
I believe this artificial separation between analysis and action is merely a remnant of the
hidden positivism that other ethnographers have warned against (Evans, 1992). Whilst
Hammersley and Atkinson acknowledge the practical and emotional difficulties some
ethnographers have had when ‘leaving the field’ (1996:121) and the frequent
establishment of friendships which persist ‘for a long time’ (1996:122), they retain an
explicit belief in the ‘identity’ of ‘the researcher’ and consider other interventionary
actions as either not constituting or even inhibiting the production of knowledge
(1996:286). This has led to criticism of their role in excluding sources of ‘Other’
knowledge:
‘Writers such as Hammersley (1995), exercise that exclusion by declaring
feminist, anti-racist, critical and emancipatory 'truths' outside the norms of
legitimate research. By a discourse of derision they are dismissed as
prejudiced, ignorant and ideological. In doing so the threat to notions of
knowledge and to sources of income, is diverted. We are not talking about
different kinds of knowledge of equal status. Stanley (1990:5) describes
how, within the 'academic mode of production' official and unofficial
gatekeepers use myriad ways of controlling academic inputs and outputs.
At the centre of these is a notion of scientism, grounded in Cartesian
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dualisms as to who can be a knower and what can be known, and
concerned with producing knowledge through the observation of the real -
those objects which exist independently of our beliefs about them. It
explicitly excludes knowledge produced through alternative research
approaches.’ (Humphries, 1997:4.6)
Melucci, however, attempts to hold these tensions in balance by acknowledging the
delimiting characteristics of the role of ‘researcher’, whilst accepting the multiple levels
of engagement that any person might have within the research context.
‘The point at which the two (researcher and subject) can meet can only be
contractual in nature. There is nothing of the missionary about this, and
the contractual meeting allows no researcher expectations as to the
destinies of the actors. The researchers may be involved as individuals, as
citizens, as political militants, but not as specialists. As such, they have
the task of performing a professional role within knowledge producing
institutions. They are therefore the bearers of the ethical and political
responsibility for the production and allocation of cognitive resources; but
they do not have the right to orient the destinies of society as ‘counsellors
of the Prince’ or as ideologues of protest’ (1996b:391).
This position exhibits a creditable acknowledgement of the inherent tensions in
maintaining and negotiating a coherent identity as a researcher (academic/activist) in a
dynamically shifting complex of social relationships; however, it could also be
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prescriptive and limiting for those activist researchers whose situated epistemology is
derived from outside the limitations of a professional role as a knowledge producer. This
is also, of course, an ethical dilemma for those activist-academics within the University
who, whilst accepting the ethical and political responsibility for the construction of
knowledge within an academic context, retain lay knowledge as either local residents,
citizens or activists. As well as experiencing the emotive and affective bonds with fellow
activists, friends and neighbours, that inevitably shape their wishes for the outcome(s) of
the event, action or campaign and the destinies of the actors involved.
Conclusion: Advocating a Meluccian methodology in the co-production of
knowledge
Melucci, I would argue, through his adherence to what Stones (1996) terms ‘sophisticated
realism’, made a significant advance in our understanding of how to research social
movements and collective action, even if those insights have yet to be thoroughly
understood and taken up. I have sought to demonstrate that Melucci’s approach to social
movement studies is in accordance with a complex and realist ontology, and that such an
ontology obliges an epistemological position which in turn suggests a particular approach
to research. Melucci, by explicitly addressing the question of how one might research
social movements (1992, 1996b), has refused to duck the question so adeptly sidestepped
by such as Giddens (1989).
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Whilst accepting that Giddens’ (1984) ‘structuration theory’ overcomes the
structure/agency dualism which has bedevilled much of sociological inquiry since the
nineteenth century, I would concur with Stones, who asserts that: ‘Giddens’ disinterest in
epistemological matters and his loose and unsystematic attitude to methodology means
that, in practice, he has few rules of sociological research’ (1996:92). There appears in
Giddens, I would suggest, a reluctance to engage with methodology because of the
diversity and plurality of research problems and potentialities. If, then, we are to conclude
that an ‘anything goes’ approach is fine as long as we are ‘loosely sensitised’ by
structuration theory, its ontological significance seems to have been vastly over-rated.
Melucci (1996b), on the other hand, is quite clear about the implications his ontology has
for the research process. The dualistic tradition of ‘density of structures versus mobility
of actors’ has indelibly marked the ‘conceptual models and research practices in the field
of collective action’ (1996b:381-82). Therefore, it is imperative that new, suitably
reflexive, and hermeneutically inspired research procedures are developed in order to be
ontologically consistent. To do otherwise is to risk repeating traditional methodological
assumptions that have by inference flattened out the bold ontological terrain we have
already charted. Method cannot be separated from ontology, and ontology has
epistemological consequences, as Melucci asserts towards the end of Challenging Codes:
‘This is not a question of innovative techniques alone. It entails, as part of
the very process of research, rendering ever more explicit the social
relations and the options that provide the procedure with its basis and
which make it possible. In other words, what is called for is, as it were, a
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situational epistemology, which social research increasingly needs if it is
to break out of the illusion that it stands outside or above the circular
observer-actor game’ (1996b:396).
Then perhaps, we may, through a systematically theorised methodology, get close enough
to the ‘real’ to argue, as Melucci does, that: ‘a limited situated knowledge can become
“true” when it carries with it the awareness of its own limitations’ (1996b:396). Indeed,
such ‘truths’ may well be the source of knowledge-practices that can begin to address the
convergence of complex crises in the early twentieth century.
During the course of this article I have argued that the widespread acknowledgment of
social movements as producers of knowledge is not matched by a commitment to social
movement research which takes seriously an ethical responsibility to respect the
ontological and epistemological frameworks of knowledge production that emerge in
social movements. I have further argued that in order to begin the task of co-producing
knowledge we must reflect upon the ontological and epistemological frameworks that
inform the academy’s engagement with movement actors in knowledge production and I
have drawn attention to the importance of social movements as actors exploring the
possibilities and limitations of structure and agency. Underpinning this endeavour is the
normative presumption that social movements are interesting because they produce
knowledge of the possibilities and limitations of human societies, knowledge which the
social sciences needs to urgently engage with and contribute to, if more creative and
desirable means of attending to complex problems are to be developed.
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